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Reclaiming Corporate Law in a
New Gilded Age
Kent Greenfield*
Corporate law matters.  Traditionally seen as the narrow study of the
relationship between managers and shareholders, corporate law has fre-
quently been relegated to the margins of legal discussion and political de-
bate.  The marginalization of corporate law has been especially prevalent
among those who count themselves as progressives.  While this has not al-
ways been true, in the last generation or so progressives have focused on
constitutional law and other areas of so-called public law, and have left cor-
porate law to adherents of neoclassical law and economics.  To the extent
that the behavior of businesses has been a matter of concern, that concern
has been aimed at adjusting the rules of environmental law, administrative
law, employment law, and the like.
The time has come to reclaim corporate law as a topic of wide debate
and progressive concern.  Instead of being a narrow discipline with limited
implications, corporate law determines the rules governing the organization,
purposes, and limitations of some of the largest and most powerful institu-
tions in the world.  By establishing the obligations and priorities of compa-
nies and their management, corporate law affects everything from
employees’ wage rates (whether in Bakersfield or Bangalore), to whether
companies will try to skirt environmental laws, to whether they will tend to
look the other way when doing business with governments that violate
human rights.  Corporate law also determines whether corporations will look
at the long term or the short term, whether they will see themselves as owing
any responsibilities to stakeholders other than shareholders, and indeed
whether they consider themselves to be constrained by law at all.
There are reasons to challenge the dominant vision of corporate law in
the United States.  Adjustments in corporate law not only could stifle the
worst impulses of the corporation but also could create room for businesses
to be a more positive social force, primarily by creating and more broadly
distributing financial surplus.
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Indeed, the main thesis of this article is that corporate law is much more
important than most progressives realize.  Corporate law can be part of the
wider task of regulating corporations in particular and business in general.
The rules that govern corporations should more expressly take into account
the fact that corporations are collective enterprises that demand investment
from a number of different sources.  These investments come in various
forms: inflows of capital from shareholders and creditors; cash inflows from
customers; infrastructural support from governments and communities; and
effort, intelligence, and direction from employees.  Whereas corporate law
presently focuses on the financial investments of shareholders only, it could,
and should, be adjusted to take into account the contributions of “non-equity
investors.”  Adjusted in this way, corporate law will make it more possible
for corporations to serve their purpose of facilitating the creation of wealth,
broadly defined and distributed.  Instead of shareholder primacy being the
lodestar for corporate decisionmaking, corporations should be governed by
the maxim of “abundance for all.”
This Article makes this argument in several steps.  Part I catalogs some
serious economic ills that exist in the United States today.  Part II draws a
link between those ills and corporate governance, arguing that the way cor-
porations allocate their resources has helped create some of the ills outlined
in Part I.  Part III is more optimistic, arguing that adjustments in corporate
law and governance can be part of a helpful response to the problems cata-
loged in Part I.  The final Part of the article draws on regulatory theory to
explain in more detail how corporate governance could be adjusted to
achieve these benefits.  Not only is corporate law an underutilized public
policy tool, it in fact may be able to achieve certain public policy goals more
efficiently than other forms of regulation.
I. ECONOMIC ILLS
If progressives were to claim a guiding statement on economic policy,
an excellent candidate would be President Franklin Roosevelt’s famous dec-
laration that “[t]he test of our progress is not whether we add more to the
abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for
those who have too little.”1  FDR’s charge guided a significant part of the
nation’s economic policy for a generation.  From 1947 to 1973, the economy
grew at an average annual rate of about 4% “and became more equal in the
process.”2  During that period, the poorest fifth of Americans saw their fam-
ily income grow faster than any other group of Americans.3
1 President Franklin Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937).
2 ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE OF OUR POLITICS
UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 16 (2007).
3 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005 71 (2004). See
also Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the
United States at Mid-Century (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3817,
1991).
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This progressive emphasis eroded during the 1970s and 1980s and has
not been a meaningful touchstone for public policy for a generation.  If this
era’s economic policy were reduced to a mantra, nothing would fit better
than Ronald Reagan’s pronouncement that “[w]hat I want to see above all is
that this remains a country where someone can always get rich.”4  The em-
phasis on the rich and well-heeled has had an impact: since 1979 the richest
20% of Americans have seen their income grow the most, by almost 50%.5
As the following chart shows, the richest 1% of Americans have had their
household income more than double in the same period.6
These trends are worsening, not improving.  For the first time since just
before the stock market crash of 1929, “the richest of the rich”—the wealth-
iest one one-hundredth of 1% of Americans—claim 5% of all reported per-
sonal income.7  In fact, the richest 10% of Americans, those Americans
making roughly $100,000 or more per year, now claim almost half of all
4 KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 91 (2002).
5 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007, 254 (2007).
6 Id. at 64 fig.1O.
7 Louis Uchitelle, The Richest of the Rich, Proud of a New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2007, at A1 (chart).  These data may in fact underreport the inequality, because a greater
percentage of income for the wealthiest individuals comes from investment income, which is
typically underreported in income tax returns. See also David Cay Johnson, Income Gap is
Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at C1.
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reported personal income.8  The richest 300,000 Americans together make as
much as the bottom 150 million Americans.9
The economic inequality is not merely a function of boom times at the
top.  It is also an outcome of low and stagnant wages at the bottom.  The
most recent economic data show that while the total reported income in the
United States grew 9% in 2005, average income fell for nine out of ten
Americans.10  Unfortunately, this stagnation is not a new phenomenon.  The
income for Americans at the bottom of the pay scale has stayed essentially
flat for thirty years, and real household income for the typical American
family has declined over the last seven years.11
The stark inequality in income is dwarfed by the nation’s inequality in
wealth.  Whereas the bottom 90% of American income earners account for
57.5% of the nation’s personal income, they control less than 30% of the
nation’s personal net worth and less than 20% of net financial assets owned
by individuals.12  By comparison, the top 1% of income earners bring in 17%
of the nation’s personal income—which is striking in its own right—and
own over 40% of net individual financial assets.  See the following table:13
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH, 2004
Distribution of:
Household income Net worth Net financial assets
All 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Top 1% 16.9 34.3 42.2
Next 9% 25.6 36.9 38.7
Bottom 90% 57.5 28.7 19.1
For detailed information on table sources, see Table Notes.
Source: Wolff (2006).
Table 5.1 taken from the Economic Policy Institute’s State of Working America 2006/2007, available
at www.epi.org
8 Johnson, supra note 7. R
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 John Irons, Typical Families See Income and Earnings Decline, Economic Snapshot for
September 5, 2007, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_snapshots_20070905.  These
declines are especially troubling when compared to the growth in labor productivity in the
United States, which has increased 32% over the past fifteen years. See EPI, Productivity and
Median and Average Compensation, 1973–2004, http://www.epi.org/datazone/06/prody_
comp.pdf.
Poverty data are also relevant.  The wages for about one out of four American workers are
so low that they fall below the poverty line, and this proportion has increased over the last few
years. See EPI, Share of All Workers Earning Poverty-Level Hourly Wages, 1973–2005, http:/
/www.epi.org/datazone/06/poverty_wages.pdf.  The data are worse for women and people of
color—nearly 30% of working women earn poverty wages, as do a third of African American
workers and almost four in ten Hispanic workers. Id.
12 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 249 tbl.5.1. R
13 Id.
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Of course, statistics vary over time, but the trends are sufficiently clear
and stable that the New York Times remarked that the concentrated wealth of
the “new tycoons . . . has made the early years of the 21st century truly
another Gilded Age.”14
For those whose public policy imperatives correlate more with Franklin
Roosevelt’s than Ronald Reagan’s, these data are quite troubling.  While it is
still premature to say that economic fairness is an issue of mainstream con-
cern, it is indeed slowly re-emerging as an issue of focus among progressive
scholars, thinkers, activists, and at least a few politicians.15  The public pol-
icy options that are increasingly touted include additional increases in the
minimum wage,16 greater legal protection for unions and union organizers,17
income tax credits,18 and even a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the
right to a job.19
There is something missing in this debate: the role of corporations, cor-
porate governance, and corporate law.  This is a crucial topic because it is
both part of the problem and a very important part of a potential solution.  It
is hardly earth shattering to point out that, in an age when wages for most
Americans are stagnating and the wealth and income of the richest Ameri-
cans are rocketing skyward, something must be wrong with how we regulate
and govern business.  Most American wealth is produced by business,20 so it
would be shocking if the trends were unrelated.  It is perhaps more surpris-
ing to think of corporate governance law as a mechanism to address some of
the economic problems the nation faces.  But the case can be made that
reforms in corporate governance offer a significant set of untapped public
policy tools that could be used to improve the fortunes of many Americans.
14 Uchitelle, supra note 7. R
15 See, e.g., JOHN EDWARDS ET AL., ENDING POVERTY IN AMERICA: HOW TO RESTORE THE
AMERICAN DREAM (2007).
16 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Making America Work: Alfred P. Murrah Professor-
ship Inaugural Lecture, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 53, 69–72 (2007); see also MISHEL ET AL., supra
note 5 at 109–70. R
17 One of the current legal initiatives being pursued by U.S. unions is the Employee Free
Choice Act, proposed legislation that would ensure workers have a fair chance to form a union
by, among other things, strengthening penalties against employers who retaliate against em-
ployees who organize and permitting workers to form a union through a “majority sign-up.”
See Why We Need the Employee Free Choice Act, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/em-
ployee-free-choice-act/resource-library/why-workers-need-the-employee-free-choice-act.html.
The Employee Free Choice Act was defeated in the Senate on June 26, 2007.  The Senate
voted 51–48 in favor of cloture, nine votes short of the sixty needed to end the filibuster.
18 See, e.g., Forman, supra note 16, at 65–69; Edmund L. Andrews, A Tax Plan as Trial R
Run for ’09 Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, at C1.
19 See, e.g., WILLIAM QUIGLEY, ENDING POVERTY AS WE KNOW IT 93–163 (2003).
20 Approximately 60% of the nation’s income comes from the corporate sector. MISHEL
ET AL., supra note 5, at 82. R
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II. CORPORATIONS, AND CORPORATE LAW, AS PART OF THE PROBLEM
Traditionally, large corporations were seen as quasi-public institutions
with social responsibilities that came as a condition of their charter.21  But
beginning just over a century ago, states began to bestow increasing power
on corporations and to remove many of the previous limits on their size and
authority.  Corporations came to be seen as supremely private entities,
whose primary purpose was making money.  Corporations now enjoy legal
benefits—including limited liability of shareholders, a perpetual existence
separate from their creators and investors, and legal and constitutional per-
sonhood—that help ensure their power and maximize the likelihood of their
success.  Corporations are also the beneficiaries of a huge array of public
resources, including the very fabric of the securities markets, infrastructural
support ranging from sewers to educational facilities, and regulatory and ju-
dicial protection of their intellectual property.  Various public sources also
contribute billions of dollars in “corporate welfare” for a variety of pur-
poses, including state and local tax incentives to affect factory location deci-
sions and federal government subsidies to support international marketing.22
These public supports of corporations are important and valuable, and
not just to the corporations themselves.  Corporations provide one of soci-
ety’s most powerful engines of wealth creation, and the nation as a whole
enjoys more abundance because of them.23
21 See KUTTNER, supra note 2, at 145 (“As late as the 1890s, many states demanded that R
corporations serve public purposes and strictly regulated their internal governance in exchange
for the limited liability granted to general corporations in their charters”); see also MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960 77 (1992).
22 See, e.g., Marilyn W. Thompson & Ron Nixon, Even Cut 50%, Earmarks Clog a Mili-
tary Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at A1 (cataloging $1.8 billion in federal payments to
private companies added to military bill for projects the Pentagon did not request); Stephen
Slivinski, The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government Subsidizes U.S. Busi-
nesses, 592 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (May 14, 2007) (detailing “$92 billion in direct and indirect
subsidies to businesses and private-sector corporate entities” in the fiscal year 2006).
23 The business form that we call the corporation is an immensely successful mechanism
for organizing business endeavors and has been so since the late 1800s. See JOHN MICKLETH-
WAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA
(2003).  Compared to the other kinds of business entities available—partnerships, trusts, lim-
ited liability companies, sole proprietorships—the corporate form is the dominant method of
organizing large (and even small) business enterprises.  This is true in the United States and
increasingly true throughout the industrialized world.  The 2002 tax returns of enterprises in
the United States show $18.8 billion in receipts for corporations, as compared to $2.6 billion
for partnerships and $1 billion for non-farm proprietorships. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 503 tbl.727 (2006).  According to Eurostat, in the
European Union during 2001, 77,861 more corporations were born than died, as compared to
9,335 enterprises organized under all other legal forms. See Eurostat, Business Demography
Indicators Presented by Legal Form, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.  For a longer treatment of
the comparative advantages of the corporate form, see Kent Greenfield, Saving the World With
Corporate Law?, 58 EMORY L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2008).
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A. Externalities
But corporations have their pathologies as well, and these pathologies
are partially a function of their advantages.  We endow the corporation with
the authority and ability to create wealth; but without constraints, it can be
overly single-minded in the pursuit of profit.  As an artificial entity, it has no
conscience of its own.  Because corporate investors are separated from man-
agerial decisionmakers, their consciences are not easily brought to bear.  The
company has every incentive to externalize costs onto those whose interests
are not included in the firm’s financial calculus.  The firm can do this in
many ways.  It can refuse to provide health benefits to its employees, leaving
Medicare or Medicaid to pick up the tab.24  It can save on production costs
by skirting environmental laws.25  It can sell shoddy products to one-time
purchasers, produce goods in sweatshops, or underfund employees’ pension
funds.26  In fact, because of the corporation’s tendency to create benefits for
itself by pushing costs onto others, the corporation could aptly be called an
“externality machine.”27
Of course not all corporations engage in such shady behavior, but those
who refuse to do so often suffer competitive disadvantages vis-a`-vis compa-
nies that do.  Society has long understood that the corporation’s penchant for
overlooking the negative impacts of its drive for profit means that, while
corporations should be appreciated for their special ability to create wealth,
they should also be treated warily, given the form and power bestowed on
them.28
24 See, e.g., WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW PRICES (Brave New Films 2005).
25 See Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1; Jane Perlez & Raymond Bonner, Below a Mountain of
Wealth, a River of Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, at A1.
26 See Roger Lowenstein, The End of Pensions?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, §6 (Maga-
zine), at 56; Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: Sweatshops
in Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C1; “Wake Up Wal-Mart” Information Sheet, availa-
ble at www.wakeupwalmart.com.  For a related (and more provocative) example, see Kent
Greenfield, September 11 and the End of History for Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1409
(2002).
27 See LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT
49–65 (2001) (calling the corporation an “externalizing machine”).
28 Justice Brandeis explained this best: “The prevalence of the corporation in America has
led men of this generation . . . to accept the evils attendant upon the free and unrestricted use
of the corporate mechanism as if these evils were the inescapable price of civilized life and,
hence, to be borne with resignation.  Throughout the greater part of our history a different view
prevailed.  Although the value of this instrumentality in commerce and industry was fully
recognized, incorporation for business was commonly denied long after it had been freely
granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes.  It was denied because of fear.  Fear
of encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual.  Fear of the subjection
of labor to capital.  Fear of monopoly.  Fear that the absorption of capital by corporations, and
their perpetual life, might bring evils . . . .  There was a sense of some insidious menace
inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations.”  Liggett v.
Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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B. Shareholder Primacy
The pathologies of the corporate form are not limited to the creation of
externalities.  In a sense, the corporation’s core pathology is its core mission:
to advance the interests of shareholders first and foremost.  In Milton Fried-
man’s famous explanation, the responsibility of directors is to conduct the
business in accordance with the “desires” of the shareholders, “which gen-
erally will be to make as much money as possible.”29  This means that the
corporation looks after the interests of other contributors to the firm (em-
ployees, communities, creditors, etc.) only to the extent that doing so ad-
vances shareholder interest, or to the extent those other contributors have
sufficient market power to prompt the corporation to consider their interests.
To be sure, not all corporate law scholars (not even all “progressive”
corporate law scholars) believe that it is a correct statement of the law that
shareholders are supreme.30  Those who contest shareholder primacy usually
argue that the business judgment rule gives management so much flexibility
and power that in fact it owes no enforceable duty to shareholders.  Some
see this flexibility as a good thing, a way to allow executives to manage for
the long term and with a view toward a broader range of responsibilities.31
Others see this flexibility but argue that it is a significant malady—one of a
number of indications of the triumph of managerial prerogative over share-
holder interests.32
The fact remains, however, that because of a mix of law, norms, and
market dynamics, the touchstone of corporate success is the maximization of
shareholder return.  There are exceptions, both in terms of companies that in
fact are able to look beyond shareholder interests and in terms of companies
whose management has used the business judgment rule to aggrandize
power and wealth at the expense of the firm (more on this below).  But these
exceptions are just that, and are unsustainable in the long term.  On the
29 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32.
30 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 287–88, 298–300, 320–21 (1999).  For responses to Blair and Stout
on this point, see Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L. J.
89, 115–17 (2005); Thomas Wuil Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of ‘Corporate Democracy’:
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735 (2003).
31 See Blair & Stout, supra note 30, at 298–300, 320–21.  Blair and Stout assert that the R
business judgment rule allows the board to balance the needs of the various stakeholders,
because they are protected from shareholder suits except in the most egregious situations.
32 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFUL-
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 45–46 (2004) (the business judgment rule is
one reason stockholders are not able adequately to challenge compensation agreements in
court); Note, Corporate Law - Fiduciary Duties of Directors - Delaware Court of Chancery
Finds Disney Directors Not Liable for Approval of an Employment Agreement Providing $140
Million in Termination Payments - In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 923 (2006) (arguing that the business judgment rule allowed executives in the Disney
case to avoid liability); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: ‘Independent’ Direc-
tors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L. J. 53, 56 (2006–2007) (the business
judgment rule protects executives’ compensation)..
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whole, shareholder primacy is a fact of life in the United States in the early
twenty-first century.
The costs of shareholder primacy are immense.  Shareholder primacy
means that corporations not only will—but should—take care of the envi-
ronment, workers, community, or ethics only when doing so serves the
shareholders in the end.  In the words of the Delaware Supreme Court, a
corporate “board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders.” 33
Consider the situation in which a board of directors of a public com-
pany makes a decision that benefits its employees financially but imposes
real, long-term costs on shareholders.  Also assume that the board makes
that decision because it has determined that benefits to the employees would
far outweigh the costs to shareholders.  Even though such a decision would
maximize the return to the firm’s stakeholders as a whole and thus would
maximize the social welfare resulting from such a decision, such a decision
would violate existing law.  The directors might be able to protect them-
selves from suit through the elasticity of the business judgment rule, but
only if they lie about their motivation and suggest that they are really acting
in the long-term interests of the shareholders.  While that might be a plausi-
ble argument some of the time, it will clearly be a reach in other situations.
The shareholder plaintiff law firms, and eventually the courts, will catch on.
Moreover, the market will punish the managers severely.  The stock price
will fall, making the company a target for takeover.  Companies whose man-
agers act as if they have duties to stakeholders other than shareholders are
squeezed out of the market.
Shareholder primacy not only narrows management’s view of their re-
sponsibilities, it also squeezes that view temporally, incentivizing a focus on
the short term.  Shareholders increasingly expect high returns quarter to
quarter, and if they do not get such returns they punish the companies that
fail to provide them.  Shareholders do not have loyalty to the companies
whose stock they hold.  Indeed, other than through initial public offerings,
few shareholders actually invest their money in the companies whose stock
they own; the vast majority of shareholders buy their stock on the secondary
market, from another stockholder who at some earlier point (months or min-
utes before) had also purchased shares in the secondary market.  If a stock is
not performing in the short term, there will always be a more appealing
company.  Not surprisingly, the average stock turnover for Fortune 500 com-
panies is over 100% a year, and is even greater for smaller companies.34
Short-termism is made worse by the size and power of institutional share-
holders such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, banks, and insur-
ance companies, which now own more than 60% of all public corporate
33 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(emphasis added).
34 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 277–78 (2007).
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equities and have their own incentive to maximize the value of their portfo-
lio in the short term.35
Shareholder primacy restricts management, keeping it focused on the
short term and on shareholder interest.  Any company that wants to take the
long-term view—or thinks it important to take into account the interests of
other firm stakeholders—will be punished in the securities markets.  Share-
holder primacy thus guarantees that any talk from management about social
responsibility will likely be for show; it will mean that legal requirements
intended to protect other stakeholders will be seen as costs rather than com-
mands;36 it will mean that any externality that does not translate into a corpo-
rate cost will be disregarded.  Non-shareholder stakeholders are left to
depend on mechanisms outside corporate law to protect their interests.
These mechanisms primarily appear in the form of express contracts or gov-
ernment regulation, both seriously imperfect.
C. Corporations and Economic Inequality
The costs of shareholder primacy also have a negative influence on the
trends mentioned early in this essay: stagnant wages for many if not most
American workers and a growing disparity between the rich and poor.
These negative effects are not inherent in the corporate form, nor in business
in general.  Americans benefit, individually and collectively, from a robust,
privately-run economy that motivates people and institutions to discover
ways to create wealth.  However, corporate law has established as a touch-
stone for corporate decision making an extremely narrow and at times
counterproductive measure of success.
Shareholder primacy is relevant to the discussion on inequality because
the requirement that managers look to maximize shareholder wealth pro-
vides disproportionate benefits to those who are already financially well-off.
The capital wealth in the United States is controlled by a tiny fraction of the
American population, so a rule requiring corporations to be managed to the
benefit of shareholders amounts to a rule that corporations should be man-
aged to benefit the rich.  The significance of this rule is hard to overstate.
35 KUTTNER, supra note 2, at 144 (arguing that these institutional investors “do not behave R
like owners.  They act more as traders, seeking short-term gain.”). See also LAWRENCE E.
MITCHELL & DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 77 (2006)(citing
statistics on block ownership by institutional investors).
36 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for
Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 765 (1984) (stating that corporate
fiduciary duties may not have a place in enforcing general law compliance if the illegality is
profitable to the corporation because the derivative suit is incapable of being a mechanism of
enforcing general law compliance); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits
by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers not only
may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”).  For responses, see Kent
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives!  A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on
How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001);
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1265 (1998).
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The richest one-tenth of 1% of Americans receive over a third of the nation’s
total capital income,37 while the bottom 80% of Americans control less than
13%.38  Consider the following chart:
Such a disproportionate benefit obviously leads to wealth and income
disparity—the rich are seizing an increasing percentage of corporate profits.
But the situation vis-a`-vis inequality is even worse than this one set of statis-
tics can show, because the source of these profits is in part a transfer from
labor.  This of course is exactly what one would expect to find in an econ-
omy where the largest income-producing sector of the economy—the corpo-
rate business sector39—operates under a duty to shift as much of its profit as
possible toward its shareholders.  The statistics bear this out.  In 2005, the
share of all corporate income that went to labor had fallen to its lowest levels
since the late 1960s, and capital’s share of corporate income (that is, profits
earned by shareholders or retained as earnings) had risen to levels not seen
in nearly forty years.40  Moreover, capital investors have seen their return per
dollar of investment improve.  In 2005, return to capital was at its highest
level in thirty-six years, except for the year 1997.  And because of the lower-
37 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 78–79. R
38 Id. at 82 fig.1S.  This chart represents 2003 data; for 2006, the estimate is that the
bottom 80% received 15.2% of capital income. See id. at 79 tbl.
39 Id. at 84.
40 Id.
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ing of taxes on corporate profits, the after-tax return on capital was even
higher and more historically dramatic.41  This expansion of capital’s share in
corporate income has apparently had real effects on wages.  The Economic
Policy Institute estimated that if the return to capital was the same in 2005 as
it had been in 1979, then wages in the corporate sector would be 5% higher.
In other words, in comparison to a generation ago, employees are transfer-
ring $235 billion more per year to capital than they were in the late 1970s.42
On the national level, these trends result in a greater percentage of total
personal income going to owners of capital and a lower percentage going to
those who earn income through wages.  Not only have the rich seized a
greater proportion of capital income, capital income itself is a greater per-
centage of personal income than it was a generation ago.43  If the economy is
a pie, the rich are getting a larger and larger percentage of the capital income
piece, which is itself growing.  The disparity effect is thus worsened.  As
economists Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Allegretto sug-
gest, “[s]ince the rich are the primary owners of income-producing prop-
erty, the fact that the assets they own have commanded an increasing share
of total income automatically leads to income growth that is concentrated at
the top.”44
These economic data reflect real operative norms within the workplace.
Shareholders’ desires for short-term returns often directly conflict with the
interests of others of the firm’s stakeholders, who are more interested in
long-term success and stability.  When such a conflict occurs, one side or the
other has to give, and in the United States it is clear which side that will be.
Even when the interests of various stakeholders do not conflict, deci-
sionmakers within the firm often assume that they do.  Executives have long
assumed, for example, that cutting employment will reduce costs, making
the company more profitable.  During the 1990s, “downsizing” became the
rage among executives who wanted to show Wall Street that they were com-
mitted to cutting costs.  Wall Street’s positive response became so predict-
able that analysts would talk about the “seven-percent rule”: whenever a
company would announce a major layoff, its share price would jump 7%.45
This share-price increase represented a shoddy assumption about the under-
lying fundamentals of the companies in question, and recent research shows
that the long-term effect of downsizing on share prices is at least unclear and
may even be negative.46
41 Id. at 86.
42 Id. at 88.
43 Id. at 80–81.
44 Id. at 81.
45 James Surowiecki, It’s the Workforce, Stupid!, NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 2007, at 32.
46 Id.  For a scholarly analysis, see Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Nicolas Couderc, How
Do Shareholders Respond to Downsizing? A Meta-Analysis, Helsinki Center of Economic Re-
search, Seminar (Feb. 2007), http://www.hecer.fi/Seminars/documents/labor_turnover/Capelle-
Blancard_Couderc.pdf; Greg Filbeck & Shelly E. Webb, Information Asymmetries, Manage-
rial Ownership, and the Impact of Layoff Announcements on Shareholder Wealth, 40(2) Q.J.
BUS. & ECON. 31 (2001) (finding “statistically significant negative share price response asso-
ciated with layoff announcements”); Henry S. Farber & Kevin F. Hallock, The Changing Rela-
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Many executives nevertheless acted as if the “seven-percent rule” was
a fact and continue to do so.  They read the Wall Street Journal more often
than economists’ working papers, and notwithstanding scholarly demonstra-
tions that the assumption is dubious, the “seven-percent rule” matches with
reality often enough that executives have their beliefs reinforced.47  When
Earthlink announced layoffs in 2007, its stock price rose 7% in a day.48  Al-
coa announced in 2006 that it was going to close plants and cut jobs, and its
stock price went up almost 6.5% over two days.49  Computer software com-
pany CA announced in 2006 it was cutting 11% of its workforce, and its
share price went up nearly 7% in a day.50  And on and on.51
The assumption that cutting employees helps a company’s financials is
simply too facile, salient, and powerful for executives looking for a quick fix
to ignore.  “Downsizing has become less a response to disaster than a de-
fault business strategy, part of an inexorable drive to cut costs.”52  This is
especially true if the executives are looking at the short term.  The average
CEO stays in his or her job for only six years—“long enough to see the
benefits of downsizing (like a lower payroll) but not long enough to suffer
costs that may appear in the long term.”53
Downsizing is just a subset of short-term business strategies that em-
phasize making profit for shareholders in the short term at the expense of
other firm stakeholders and the firm as a whole in the long term.  In addition,
tionship Between Job Loss Announcements and Stock Prices: 1970–1999 (Princeton Univ.,
Univ. Ill. & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, 2004) (finding that the overall
stock price reaction to job loss announcements, on average, was negative but that this negative
reaction was getting smaller over time).
47 See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 163–70 (2006) (Discussing the idea
that people generally seek only facts and knowledge that confirm conclusions they have al-
ready reached).
48 See Earthlink to Trim Work Force and Close Offices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at C9.
49 See Plant Closings Are Set at Alcoa, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006, at C8.  Alcoa, the
world’s largest aluminum producer, announced on November 21, 2006, that it was going to
close plants and cut as many as 6,700 jobs. See id.  Its stock price rose from $28.58 at the start
of November 21, to $30.43 at the close on November 22, an increase of almost 6.5%. See
Yahoo! Finance Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.com.
50 Software Maker, Struggling with Turnaround, to Cut 1,700 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2006, at C8.  CA announced these job cuts on August 14, 2006.  Its stock price opened that day
at $21.71 and closed on August 15 at $23.24, an increase of approximately 7%.  See Yahoo!
Finance Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.com.
51 See Countrywide to Cut Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at C12.  On October 24, 2006,
Countrywide Financial announced it was cutting its workforce by 2,500, or 5%.  Its stock price
opened October 24 at $35 and closed the day at $37.33, an increase of almost 7%. See Yahoo!
Finance Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.com.  On June 14, 2006, United Airlines an-
nounced cuts to its salaried workforce of 11%, a total workforce reduction of 2%. See United
Airlines Plans to Lay Off 11% of Its Salaried Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2006, at C12.
The stock of the UAL corporation, which owns United, rose from $27 at the start of June 14, to
$30.42 by the time of closing on June 15, 2006, a rise of almost 13%. See Yahoo! Finance
Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.com.  On January 24, 2006, Daimler Chrysler an-
nounced elimination of 6,000 jobs. See Carter Dougherty, Cost-Cutting at Daimler to Elimi-
nate 6,000 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at C3.  The stock price rose $2.60 that day to
$54.84, a 5% increase. See Yahoo! Finance Historical Prices, http://finance.yahoo.com.
52 Surowiecki, supra note 45. R
53 Id.
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corporations achieve the same effect by keeping wages low, limiting or cut-
ting medical benefits or pension contributions, or ignoring environmental
regulations.  These strategies do not even need to work; executives simply
need to believe they will work, at least in the short term.
There is a final way in which corporate law creates economic inequal-
ity.  As discussed above, the business judgment rule gives executives large
discretion in managing the firm.  Senior management have used this flexibil-
ity to increase their compensation to unprecedented levels.54  There are a
number of notable examples, the most prominent being the Disney case,
where Michael Eisner hired his friend Michael Ovitz as second-in-com-
mand.  After only eighteen months, Ovitz was forced out, but left with
nearly $140 million in total compensation.  After protracted, multi-year liti-
gation, the Delaware courts held that the company’s management had not
violated their fiduciary duties in compensating Ovitz so richly.55
The data bear out the anecdotal evidence of enormous increases in ex-
ecutive compensation.  In 1965, the CEOs of major U.S. companies earned
24 times that of an average worker.  By 2005, this ratio had ballooned to 262
times the average worker.56  “In other words, in 2005 a CEO earned more in
one workday (there are 260 in a year) than what the average worker earned
in 52 weeks.”57  The median CEO saw his total compensation increase 186%
between 1992 and 2005, while the median worker saw wages rise by only
7%.58  The average CEO of a Fortune 500 company now makes nearly $10
million per year,59 and CEO compensation now amounts to roughly 10% of
corporate profits.60
One might consider such outrageous executive compensation as under-
mining the story of shareholder primacy and as evidence of the ascendancy
of managerial power exercised to the detriment of shareholders.  Scholars
who oppose giving managers more authority to look after the interests of
non-equity stakeholders point to the rise in executive compensation as indi-
cating the risk that managers will use this new authority simply to feather
their own nests.61  In this view, necessary corporate law reforms include
mechanisms to give shareholders more power within the firm.62
There are certainly examples of executives disregarding shareholder in-
terests in order to aggrandize power and accumulate financial wealth.  Rob-
54 See sources cited supra note 32. R
55 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 728–40 (Del. Ch. 2005);  Brehm
v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
56 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 202.  According to a study published by the Institute for R
Policy Studies and United for a fair economy, this ratio is now at 364 to 1. SARAH ANDERSON
ET AL., Executive Excess 2007: The Staggering Social Cost of U.S. Business Leadership 5
(2007), available at   http://www.faireconomy.org/reports/2007/ExecutiveExcess2007.pdf.
57 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 202. R
58 Id. at 202–03.
59 Id. at 204 tbl.
60 Id. at 86.
61 See sources cited supra note 32. R
62 See ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 261–88 (1996).
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ert Nardelli of Home Depot is a popular recent example.  While he was head
of Home Depot, his annual compensation grew as high as $38 million, but
the company’s share price was stagnant and outperformed by competitors.63
Nardelli’s compensation caused a revolt among Home Depot shareholders
and he was eventually forced to leave.  His high compensation was not the
problem (there were at least fifty-five CEOs who made more than he did in
2005).64  The problem, rather, was his high compensation compared to the
languid stock performance.  In fact, the dispute that was the ultimate cause
of his “resignation” reportedly was his refusal to tie his compensation more
closely to share price.  He claimed, with good cause, that most of the com-
pany’s financials during his tenure were quite good, and that the stock price
was one measure of company performance that he could not control.65  But
the company’s shareholders would not stand for it, and the board listened,
forcing him out.  Nardelli’s story is not a story of how shareholders have no
power.  It is precisely the opposite.66
If executives were, on the whole, aligned against shareholder power,
then one would have expected to see lower executive compensation correlate
with the rise in the power of institutional shareholders over the past decade.
But instead, the dominance of institutional shareholders has, for the most
part, gone hand in hand with high executive compensation.  Executive com-
pensation has become the carrot that shareholders use to entice management
to focus primarily on shareholder value (and consequently to disregard other
stakeholders).  In this view, high executive compensation is evidence of
shareholder primacy.  When executives are called on to justify their high
salaries, they point not to the value of the company in creating jobs or pro-
viding useful goods and services, but to shareholder gain.67
63 Brian Grow, Nardelli: Out at Home Depot, MSNBC ONLINE, Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/16469224 (last visited November 13, 2007); see also Peter Cohen, Best &
Worst: Nardelli Builds Himself a Fat Pay Plan, BLOGGINGSTOCKS, Dec. 5, 2006, http://www.
bloggingstocks.com/2006/12/05/best-and-worst-bob-nardelli-builds-himself-a-fat-pay-plan-at-
home (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
64 Del Jones & Matt Krantz, Home Depot Boots CEO Nardelli, USA TODAY ONLINE, Jan.
4, 2007, tbl.,  http//www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2007-01-03-hd-nardelli_x.htm.
65 Grow, supra note 63; Julie Creswell & Michael Barbaro, Home Depot Board Ousts R
Chief, Saying Goodbye With Big Check, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at A1; Richard Beales,
Nardelli’s Forced Departure Reveals Some Home Truths, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 5, 2007
(Markets), at 29.
66 Indeed, his sins must not have been unforgivable.  The private equity investors who
recently purchased Chrysler from Daimler hired Nardelli as Chrysler’s new CEO.  Micheline
Maynard & Nick Bunkley, Ex-Home Depot Chief Taking Reins at Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2007, at A1.
67 See Uchitelle, supra note 7 (“Some chief executives of publicly traded companies ac- R
knowledge that their fortunes are indeed large—but that it reflects only a small share of the
corporate value created on their watch”).  Lew Frankfort, CEO of Coach, justified his $44
million compensation in 2006 by pointing to shareholder gain, saying “I don’t think it is unrea-
sonable . . . for a CEO of a company to realize 3 to 5 percent of the wealth accumulation that
shareholders realize.” Id.  Sanford Weill, the former chairman of Citigroup, defended his com-
pensation by saying, “I think that the results our company had, which is where the great
majority of my wealth came from, justified what I got.” Id. See also Robert B. Reich, CEOs
Deserve Their Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, at A13.
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While the increase in CEO and executive salaries by itself adds to eco-
nomic inequality, the collusion between executives and Wall Street creates a
snowball effect.  Neither has an incentive to slow the push for more and
more income for themselves—shareholders keep getting theirs, managers
keep getting theirs, and those who gain their livelihood from wage work are
left further and further behind.  Managers are not compensated for how they
benefit their employees or the communities where they do business.  Money
spent for those things is regarded as costs, not profits, and those mere ac-
counting conventions reveal the underlying assumption within corporate law
that shareholders are the only owners and it is their fortunes that count.
III. CORPORATIONS, AND CORPORATE LAW, AS PART OF A SOLUTION
The costs of the current framework of corporate law are significant.
The framework entices corporations to spin off externalities, and the law has
tried in various ways to react to those costs by regulating corporations.  But
what has not been recognized or emphasized is that the framework of corpo-
rate law has worsened certain macroeconomic trends, such as the stagnation
of wages for working Americans and the increasing levels of economic ine-
quality in our country.
Some might argue that even if these costs are real, there is no reason for
any additional public policy response.  One might think that the inequality is
itself a good thing, since it motivates individuals to work hard and strive for
success within the market.  Others might see these economic effects as in-
herent in a corporate system that otherwise does an excellent job of creating
wealth for the economy as a whole.  If the costs of the framework are justi-
fied by its benefits, then any change in the framework will put those benefits
at risk.
A rigorous empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of various corpo-
rate governance regimes is certainly beyond the scope of this article, if not
impossible.  But the existing legal framework is itself not based on an empir-
ical justification.  For some, it is based on notions about the nature of the
firm—i.e., that shareholders own the firm and the managers owe them duties
because of the nature of that ownership.68  For others, it is based on judg-
ments, which are themselves unproven, about how existing corporate law
benefits the nation as a whole.69  The status quo cannot claim a presumption
of superiority over other possibilities other than through its position as the
status quo.  Those who are not disciples of Edmund Burke need more.70
68 But see KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006) 43–47 (rebutting
notion of shareholder ownership).
69 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that shareholder primacy maximizes social welfare).
For a response, see GREENFIELD, supra note 68, at 21–26. R
70 See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.  (Charles W. Eliot
ed., The Harvard Classics 2001) (1790) (arguing for the value of tradition and the status quo).
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For those who would use Roosevelt rather than Burke as a guide, the
question is this: If the present economic status quo contains conditions that
fall short of what we aspire to achieve as a nation, are there tools at our
disposal that are underutilized and potentially efficacious in addressing these
shortfalls?  There is a case to be made that corporate law is such a tool, and
that adjustments in the way corporations govern themselves could bring
about meaningful improvements in the lives of many Americans.  Moreover,
using corporate governance to help achieve these ends may be more efficient
and less costly than other forms of regulation.
A. Starting Premises and Principles
In arguing that adjustments to corporate law could be an important reg-
ulatory tool in addressing issues of stagnant wages and economic inequality,
the underlying assumptions must be clear.71  First, and perhaps the most fun-
damental, is that corporate law is not an area of law governed by rights of
ownership in the traditional sense.72  The view of shareholders as owners
was once championed by a few traditionalists who derived shareholder
rights from a rights-based view of the private nature of corporations.73
Under this view, shareholders are seen as the owners of the firm, and the
corporation is their individual property.  Their control is to be respected.
Managers are agents, and the correct law to apply is the law of property and
trusts.  Managers are to serve their principals.  The proper stance of govern-
ment is one of deference, with minimal or no governmental regulation.
The defects with this model are numerous and pervasive.  Despite its
residual popular appeal,74 the model does not find legitimacy in the reality of
the corporate world today.  Shareholders do not have a complete bundle of
rights to make them owners in the traditional sense: they do not have the
right to gain access to the company’s place of business, the right to exclude
others from the property, the right to decide upon the use of the property on
a day-to-day basis, or practically any other right usually associated with the
ownership of a piece of property.  Moreover, little distinguishes the contri-
71 For a different iteration of these arguments, with a response, see Kent Greenfield &
Gordon Smith, Debate: Can Corporate Law Save the World?, 58 EMORY L. J. ___ (forthcom-
ing 2008).
72 See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 591–601 (2002) (arguing
that corporate law should be seen as public law rather than private law); Thomas W. Joo,
Contract, Property and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
779 (2002).
73 The leading advocate of this view remains Milton Friedman, and the most famous state-
ment of this view is his essay in the New York Times over thirty-five years ago. See Friedman,
supra note 29, at 32 (“In a free-enterprise, private-property system a corporate executive is an R
employee of the owners of the business.  He has direct responsibility to his employers.  That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will
be to make as much money as possible. . . .”).
74 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, The Owners Who Can’t Hire or Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2007, at C1.
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butions shareholders make to the firm from those of other stakeholders.  To
say that shareholders are the only “owners” is to say that there is something
inherent in the act of contributing money to buy shares—or in the definition
of “ownership” of shares—that distinguishes that act from the contribution
of money to buy bonds issued by the company, the supply of raw materials
to be refined by the company, or the investment of human labor to be used
by the company.  For these reasons, an argument that corporate governance
operates in the realm of ownership rights is a difficult, unpersuasive, and
increasingly undefended contention.  Even among those scholars who de-
fend shareholder primacy, very few continue to make the ownership argu-
ment.  Instead, they argue that shareholder primacy is justified by other
rationales, not a rights-based “ownership” claim.75
This leads to this article’s second major premise: corporations, and
therefore corporate law, are created in the interest of society as a whole.
Corporations are state creations, and no rational state would willfully allow
for the creation of institutions as powerful as corporations unless there was a
belief that, on balance, society would be better off.  To be clear, this does not
necessarily mean that the internal rule of decisionmaking within the corpora-
tion should be that the managers always act to maximize the benefit to soci-
ety.  But it does mean that whatever rule society constructs for corporate
decisionmaking—whether one of shareholder primacy, stakeholder balance,
or societal protection—the ultimate goal is to create social welfare, broadly
defined.
Even though it would seem obvious that corporations should be created
only if they, on balance, create more benefit than harm, this principle is
largely absent in corporate law doctrine, judicial opinions, corporations
casebooks, and business courses in both law and business schools.  Occa-
sionally one will come across a source that does consider the corporation’s
responsibility to society,76 but for the most part, judges and mainstream cor-
porate law scholars take shareholder primacy as the guiding principle and
ignore the interests of the public, unless those interests are something the
company should take into account in an instrumental way to maximize
shareholder value.
Of course, “social welfare” is an elastic term that is difficult to define
with precision.  What is crucial, however, is the importance of defining so-
cial benefits and costs broadly.  Benefits include not only profit to the share-
holders but also workers’ earnings, the stability a company brings to
communities in which it does business, the quality and importance of the
company’s products or services, and more.  Costs include pollution, deple-
tion of scarce resources, harmful effects of the company’s products or ser-
vices, and mistreatment of employees.  Ultimately, the social value of a
company is not measurable by looking at shareholder return alone, which is
75 For a comprehensive review of the arguments in favor of shareholder primacy, includ-
ing the notion of ownership, and responses to each, see GREENFIELD, supra note 68, at 41–47. R
76 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 69, at 441 (saying that “all thoughtful people” R
agree that business should be organized to increase social welfare).
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hardly the best proxy for broader measures.  Shareholder return may at times
be consistent with social welfare, but it is often uncorrelated with social
welfare and may at times be negatively correlated with social welfare.
The argument that corporations are intended to benefit society does not
depend on an expectation of benevolence from corporations.  It relies rather
on another premise: corporations are distinctively able to contribute to so-
cial welfare by creating financial prosperity.  Public corporations bring to-
gether a number of characteristics that distinguish them from other kinds of
businesses and that make them particularly successful in making money.
These traits include easy transferability of shares, limited liability, special-
ized and centralized management, and a perpetual existence separate from
their shareholders.  These and other characteristics create a potentially pow-
erful money-making institution, which occupies a special place in our soci-
ety.  The corporation should not be expected to act altruistically in the same
way as churches, families, schools, or social service organizations do.  Cor-
porations are institutions with a distinctive purpose, which is to create
wealth.  If they stop creating wealth, they are failures.
It follows, then, that a corporation that does nothing more than create
wealth for its shareholders, employees, and communities is providing an im-
portant social service.  Even if the corporation does nothing else to advance
social welfare, assuming its benefits to society outweigh the cost of the ex-
ternalities it casts upon the society, the corporation has satisfied its purpose
for existence.  It may be a good thing if a business provides meaning for
people who work there, finds a cure for cancer, or funds the local symphony.
These things all add to the positive side of the social benefit “ledger,” but
these benefits are extras.  A company that is otherwise a neutral, lukewarm
actor in society can still be counted as a success if it creates wealth for
society.  Indeed, care should be taken that over-regulation of corporations
does not destroy their ability to contribute to society by building its wealth.
Importantly, the wealth that matters includes not only monetary gain by
shareholders but also gains to other stakeholders.  We must include the value
to employees of their jobs and the social worth of the goods or services sold,
as well as the multiplier effect on other businesses that provide raw materi-
als, transport the end product to market, or sell sandwiches to the employees
at lunchtime.
All this is to say that corporations should be appreciated for their spe-
cial ability to create wealth but, as described in Part I, should be treated
warily because of their inability (absent regulation) to take into account val-
ues far more important than wealth.  We should be persistent in our monitor-
ing of corporations to make sure they are moving us in a positive direction,
given the form and powers we have bestowed upon them.  The ability to
create wealth is a very important power of corporations.  As any powerful
force, it must be constrained and regulated to ensure it does not careen out of
control.
In this light, the next underlying premise becomes clear: the socially
optimal amount of regulation of corporations is not zero.  The free market is
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a figment of imaginations, and only of outlandish ones at that.  Even the
most shareholder-centric scholars acknowledge that public policy demands
regulation of the corporation; they just believe that it should come in the
form of external, rather than internal, regulation.77  Corporations will not,
through their own generosity, internalize the external costs of their decisions
or keep an eye on the social harms they produce.  We use law to grant corpo-
rations the characteristics that make them capable of generating great wealth,
but we also need to constrain them with law.  Whether corporate law should
be adjusted to take into account the interests of non-equity investors—those
other than shareholders who contribute to the firm—should therefore turn on
whether such an adjustment would tend to create more social welfare,
broadly defined, not on whether it is inconsistent with the so-called free
market.
Finally, the use of the term “non-equity investor” as a way to charac-
terize stakeholders embodies the last premise of this article: corporations
are collective entities, demanding a variety of investments from a variety of
sources.  This last premise is simply a statement of one of the important
implications of the first—that corporations are not an entity wherein “own-
ership” makes much sense.  Shareholders own their shares, of course, but as
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout write, “shareholders are not the only group
that provides essential, specialized inputs into public corporations.”78  Bond-
holders own their bonds, suppliers own their inventory, governments “own”
their infrastructure, and workers “own” their labor.  All of these contribute
something essential to the firm, and none does so altruistically.  They all
contribute to the firm because they believe they will gain more by allowing
the corporation to collect and use their inputs than if they keep them to
themselves.79  Indeed, the notion that corporations depend on multiple stake-
holders is implicit in most theories of the firm.80
77 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1271 (1982) (Arguing that those who are concerned with corporate mis-
deeds should “seek redress through the political process and [should] not . . . attempt to
disrupt the voluntary arrangements that private parties have entered into in forming corpora-
tions.”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23, 42 (1991) (expanding the scope of a firm’s fiduciary duties to include local communities is
unnecessary because such communities “can appeal to their elected representatives in state and
local government for redress”).
78 Blair & Stout, supra note 30, at 250. R
79 For a more detailed argument, see GREENFIELD, supra note 68, at 47–53 (noting that R
workers have agency costs of their own).
80 The modern theory of the corporation owes much to Ronald Coase, who theorized that
the firm exists when it is more efficient to engage in intra-firm transactions (organized by
direct authority) rather than market transactions. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW 33–55 (1988).  Thus the theory of the firm much depends on insights about
when it is most efficient for people to work together within a firm rather than through individ-
ually negotiated contracts. Other writings on the economics of the firm turn on arguments
about the consolidation of productive work. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)
(arguing that the firm exists to decrease the monitoring costs inherent in team production);
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B. Corporate Law as Public Policy
With these underlying premises, it is straightforward to recognize cor-
porate law as a subset of the broad range of business regulation used in this
country and elsewhere to channel corporate power toward socially beneficial
ends.  Corporate law’s imposition of the duties of care and loyalty help en-
sure that managers perform their tasks dutifully and without acting on the
basis of self-interest.  The duties to disclose certain kinds of information to
shareholders and not to commit fraud on shareholders (mostly arising from
federal law but still best seen as “corporate law,” as this article uses the
term) are other ways that corporations’ internal affairs are regulated in fur-
therance of public policy goals.  The question is whether corporate law
should be put into use in furtherance of those public policy goals that extend
beyond creating money and protecting shareholders from managerial negli-
gence, theft, or mendacity.
This question—whether corporate governance should be adjusted to
take into account the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders—depends
primarily on the answer to another question: whether it is more efficient to
regulate corporations from the “outside” or from the “inside.”  In other
words, since the corporation is a creature of law and is already pervasively
regulated, the question is simply whether it would be more efficient to use
corporate law to oblige businesses to consider the interests of non-equity
investors or to continue to use the existing regulatory structure, which leaves
their interests to be protected through costly, ad hoc regulatory initiatives
external to the corporate form.
Perhaps it is useful to begin with the acknowledgement that this “exter-
nal” versus “internal” dichotomy is too simple.  Regulations of corporations
come in a multitude of forms.  Even ones that are seen as external—tax law,
for example—often have as a goal the adjustment of behavior within the
firm.  It is more correct, as a matter of regulatory theory, to characterize the
regulation of the corporation as falling into three categories: (1) regulation
requiring or encouraging certain results (e.g., pollution laws that prohibit the
discharge of certain effluents); (2) regulation requiring or encouraging cer-
tain processes or actions (e.g., disclosure laws, nondiscrimination laws); and
(3) regulation requiring or encouraging certain internal structures (e.g., a
board that is elected by shareholders).  When characterized this way, it be-
comes clear that the non-equity investors in corporations typically are forced
to depend on regulatory initiatives that focus on results and on procedures.
The only stakeholder that has any significant structural protection within the
corporate form is the shareholder.  It is this reality that best reveals the norm
of shareholder primacy.  Consider the following chart:
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976) (“Contractual relations
are the essence of the firm, not only with employees” but with others as well; the firm is a
legal fiction that “serves as a focus for the complex process in which the conflicting objectives
of individuals . . . are brought into equilibrium. . . .”).
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ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY EFFORTS TO CONSTRAIN AND
HARNESS CORPORATE POWER81
Stakeholders Regulatory Focus
Results Actions/Process Structure
Shareholders Limited liability Duty of care Shareholder voting for direc-
Profit-maximization “norm” Duty of loyalty tors
Capital markets (Quasi-legal) Disclosure law Right to sue derivatively
Anti-fraud law (10b-5) Right to vote on major cor-
Insider trading law porate changes
Employees Minimum wage ERISA (regulates retirement
OSHA benefits; limited protection
only)
Tort/workers’ comp law
Anti-discrimination law
Federal plant closing notifi-
cation requirements
Labor law (limited)
Community/ “Command and control” Tort law
Environment environmental statutes; Environmental Impact State-
Superfund, Clean Air/Water ments
Acts, etc. Planning/permitting/zoning
processes
Customers Contract law Anti-fraud law
Consumer Safety law Tort law
Regulatory protections (food Antitrust law
& drug, consumer protection,
air safety, etc.)
Creditors Contract Law Good faith in Contract/Uni-
form Commercial Code
Anti-fraud law
Bankruptcy law
One might think that this chart shows the extent of the regulatory ef-
forts aimed at protecting stakeholders of various kinds, and that nothing else
needs to be done.  This response would be apt if the interests of stakeholders
were in fact being adequately protected by these efforts.  Another response
to this chart is to question why regulation of the corporate structure—the
stuff of corporate law—is not being utilized to its full potential.  The empty
boxes in the rightmost column represent regulatory gaps and opportunities—
presently ignored—to address employee, community, and environmental
concerns.  Taking advantage of these opportunities is a question of whether
the corporation’s structure can be adjusted so that its distinctive abilities can
be put to greater use in protecting non-shareholder stakeholders.
There is reason to be optimistic in this regard.  It is often cheaper to
avoid a problem than to rectify it later, and it is often better to give the
responsibility to avoid a problem to the person who knows most about it and
can avoid it at the least expense.  As such, corporate law may have compara-
tive advantages over other kinds of law in addressing the concerns of its
stakeholders.
81 Another version of this chart appears in Greenfield & Smith, supra note 71.
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For example, because the central purpose of the corporation is to create
wealth, broadly defined, it is likely to be more efficient to have the corpora-
tion distribute this wealth among those who contribute to its creation rather
than having government redistribute wealth after the fact through tax and
welfare laws.  A fair distribution of corporate profit to employees, for exam-
ple, will likely have significant positive multiplier effects (such as workers
being more productive because they feel they are being fairly treated) that
would not likely occur with later governmental redistribution initiatives.
Moreover, in dealing with issues such as economic well-being or envi-
ronmental sustainability, corporate managers may have expertise that gov-
ernment bureaucrats do not, and there may be efficiencies in a corporate
setting that do not exist in a governmental setting.  Broadening corporate
responsibilities would allow corporations and their management to be proac-
tive in addressing issues of social concern, which in turn might be more
efficient than relying on the mostly reactive power of government
regulation.
In the end, if non-shareholder stakeholders need more regulatory pro-
tection than they now receive, it is foolish and inefficient as a matter of
public policy to leave corporate law as an untapped resource.  Using corpo-
rate law to adjust the composition or duties of the board to force the consid-
eration of stakeholder interests could be a powerful tool, not only to rein in
the worst excesses of the corporation, but also to take advantage of the
unique capabilities of the corporation to achieve important gains in social
welfare.
C. The Benefits of Stakeholder Governance
To bolster this argument with a concrete example, examine how adjust-
ments in corporate governance could efficiently bring about gains in societal
wealth.  The corporation is immensely successful in creating wealth, but be-
cause of the narrow fixation on shareholder benefit embedded in the market,
social norms, and corporate law, non-equity investors (employees, commu-
nities, etc.) are often shortchanged in the distribution of the wealth they help
create.  Even though the corporation is a collective enterprise when it comes
to inputs, the distribution of outputs is determined by a body—the board—
dominated by representatives of only two stakeholders: the shareholders and
the senior management.  Changing this arrangement has the potential not
only to improve the corporation’s ability to create wealth, but also to address
serious and enduring social and economic ills.  Almost certainly, if senior
managers were required to consider the interests of the firm more broadly—
to include the well-being of all investors, equity or non-equity—in their
decisionmaking calculus, the firm would be more successful in satisfying the
social goal of creating wealth, broadly defined.
Stakeholder concerns could be added to the firm’s decisionmaking
calculus in a couple of ways.  First, the fiduciary duties of management
could simply be expanded to include a requirement that the management
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owe a fiduciary duty to the firm as a whole, rather than to the shareholders
alone.  Once the fiduciary duties extend to the entire firm, and the firm is
seen as a collective enterprise, then managers cannot meet their duties by
fixating solely on the interests of shareholders.82
A more powerful change would come through acknowledging that a
duty to the firm as a whole—which includes a duty to a range of stakehold-
ers—would be best effected by providing some mechanism for non-share-
holder stakeholders to elect their own representatives to the board.  While
the duties of care and loyalty are crucial, they have little connection to the
problem of fair allocation of the corporate surplus.  The best way for the
board to make such decisions is to have all important stakeholders repre-
sented.  The specifics will be difficult but not impossible: employees could
elect a proportion of the board, communities in which the company employs
a significant percentage of the workforce could propose a representative for
the board, and long-term business partners and creditors could be repre-
sented as well.83  For specific ideas as to mechanisms for choosing stake-
holder directors, one could look at the procedures used in various European
countries that have boards with non-shareholder representatives.84
The specific mechanisms of election do not matter as much as does the
notion that the board itself should hear more than a shareholder perspective
only.  As they participate on the board, all stakeholder representatives will
have the incentive to build and maintain profitability in order to sustain the
company over time.  Moreover, the board will be the locus of the real nego-
tiations among the various stakeholders about the allocation of the corporate
surplus.  Even though board members might be selected for their positions in
different ways and from different constituencies, each would be held to fidu-
ciary duties to the firm as a whole.  Decisions that affect major stakeholders
would no longer be made cavalierly, without someone on the board being
able to anticipate and articulate the likely impact such a decision would have
on the workers, creditors, and other interested stakeholders.
The benefits of stakeholder representation on corporate boards could be
significant.  First, this change would likely benefit society broadly by dis-
tributing corporate wealth more fairly.  It is reasonable to expect stakeholder
boards to behave differently from shareholder boards.  The market will be a
82 Some scholars believe that this is in fact the best statement of current law, and there are
cases that seem to stand for that proposition. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 30. R
Even if one disagrees with their descriptive claim that current corporate law protects all stake-
holders, the fact that discussion exists at all means that this adjustment would be less stark than
one might suppose at first glance.
83 “Co-determination,” the practice of having employee representatives on company
boards, is widespread in Europe.  “Employees in 18 of the 25 European member states have
the right to have their interests represented in their company’s top administrative and manage-
ment bodies.” REBECCA PAGE, CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY—A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 31
(2006).  For an excellent overview, see THE EUROPEAN COMPANY—PROSPECTS FOR WORKER
BOARD-LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN THE ENLARGED EU 64–65 (Norbert Kluge & Michael Stollt,
eds., 2006)(chart of co-determination forms around Europe).
84 See THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 83, at 36–39, 93– 95 (summarizing methods R
of election for employee representatives).
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constraint, to be sure, but one of the goals of the board will be to allocate the
surplus so as to maintain the firm as a going concern.  Shareholders will get
their proportion, but so will others.  In a sense, this conception would use the
corporation not only as a mechanism for creation of wealth but for its distri-
bution as well.
There may be a comparative advantage to using stakeholder governance
over other kinds of regulatory efforts.  Current public policy tools that redis-
tribute wealth and income tend to either take effect after the initial distribu-
tion of financial wealth (e.g., taxes, welfare policy) or benefit only those at
the lowest rung of the economic ladder (e.g., the minimum wage).  These
mechanisms are notoriously inefficient.  A stakeholder-oriented corporate
governance system would operate at the initial distribution of the corporate
surplus and would benefit stakeholders up and down the economic hierarchy
and earlier in the wealth creation process.
This is not as jarring as it might seem at first.  In the United States, and
indeed in most industrialized countries, one of the most important tasks of
the state is to redistribute a portion of private wealth and income.  Mecha-
nisms include the tax and welfare system, the minimum wage, and Social
Security.  At base, this article proposes simply that the structure of corporate
law be adjusted to better serve this purpose as well.
Evidence from other nations bolsters this argument.  The majority of
European Union countries require representation of employee interests in
their company’s top administrative and management bodies.85  This insis-
tence on taking employees’ interests into account has beneficial effects.  In a
recent study, Sigurt Vitols measured the macroeconomic implications of
worker participation in corporate management throughout Europe.  On a
countrywide level, European countries with strong “co-determination” (i.e.,
worker participation on boards) had lower income inequality than countries
that have no or weak worker participation.  Moreover, strong co-determina-
tion countries had higher labor productivity, fewer days lost to strikes, and
lower unemployment.86
Not only will adjustments in corporate governance create beneficial ef-
fects, but these benefits may be achieved at a much lower cost than through
other regulatory initiatives, because stakeholder governance will benefit cor-
porations themselves over time.  Because corporations are a collective effort,
the key to sustainability is for those who contribute to the firm to believe
that the firm can be trusted.  Broadening stakeholder representation will help
build this trust, ensuring that all stakeholders will be willing to invest in the
firm whether by way of financial investments, or investments in terms of
labor or expertise.  For example, workers who believe they are treated fairly
tend to work harder, be more productive, obey firm rules more often, and be
85 PAGE, supra note 83, at 31; THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 83, at 64–65. R
86 Sigurt Vitols, Prospects for Trade Unions in the Evolving European System of Corpo-
rate Governance, Final Report for European Trade Union Institute, Nov. 2005 (on file with
author).
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more loyal to their employers.  This, in turn, is likely to make those firms
more profitable than they would have been absent such fair treatment.87
If stakeholder governance would help firms be more profitable, why do
so few firms voluntarily adopt it?  One answer is that some firms already try
to share wealth created by the collective action of their stakeholders, and
some firms even recognize that they owe an obligation to treat all their
stakeholders fairly.  The more general answer is that, in all likelihood, firms
simply do not see the potential long-term profitability of stakeholder govern-
ance.  Boards are elected by shareholders, and the law makes shareholders
supreme.  Few directors or managers have the incentive to push their firms
to take what must seem like a huge short-term risk—reallocating a greater
portion of the corporate surplus to non-shareholder stakeholders—for gains
that seem abstract.  Moreover, since many shareholders are interested only in
the short term (as described earlier), the likelihood of long-term benefits is
immaterial.  No one has the incentive to make the first move.  The law must
overcome this “stickiness” of the status quo.
Another reason why stakeholder governance would be beneficial to the
firm is that it would improve managerial decisionmaking.  The success of
corporations comes about in part because of the abilities of a highly talented
group decisionmaker, the board, at the top of the hierarchy.88  The benefits of
group decisionmaking, however, are drastically diminished, and sometimes
undermined completely, when the group is too homogeneous.  In fact, more
and more studies show that good decisionmaking requires a diversity of
viewpoints.  As Cass Sunstein detailed in his book Why Societies Need Dis-
sent, conformity among people in a decisionmaking group inevitably breeds
error.  Dissent is essential, and sometimes “social bonds and affection” can
suppress dissent.89  Sunstein notes, “if strong bonds make even a single dis-
sent less likely, the performance of groups and institutions will be im-
paired.”  He extends the point to corporate boards: “The highest performing
companies tend to have extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as a
duty and that ‘have a good fight now and then.’” 90
If homogeneity is a flaw, then corporate boards are indeed suboptimally
constituted.  At present, corporate boards are among the least diverse institu-
tions in America.  A 2002 survey found that 82% of the director positions on
Fortune 1000 companies were held by white men while only 14% were held
by women, 3% by African-Americans, 2% by Asian-Americans, and 2% by
Hispanics.91
These statistics reference only racial and gender diversity, but the point
is likely even stronger when it comes to diversity of perspective and back-
87 For a more developed argument on this point, see Greenfield, supra note 72, at 611–27. R
88 For a more detailed analysis, see Greenfield & Smith, supra note 71. R
89 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 27 (2003).
90 Id. at 28 (quoting Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, 80 HARV.
BUS. REV. 106, 111 (2002)).
91 See Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys’ Network Still Rules Corporate Boards, USA TODAY,
Nov. 1, 2002, at 1B.
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ground.  This homogeneity is a function of legal decisions—giving the right
to elect board members to shareholders and the right to nominate to the
board itself.  But this could be changed through law as well.  Adding per-
spectives other than those of rich, white men will almost certainly improve
the quality of business decisions made by the board.
Adding diversity of perspectives to the board is hardly as radical as it
might at first seem.  Even mainstream scholars are sometimes found to rec-
ognize the benefits of board pluralism.  For example, Steven Bainbridge has
said in the context of suggesting that larger boards are better than smaller
boards that “[m]ore directors will usually translate into more interlocking
relationships with other organizations that may be useful in providing re-
sources such as customers, clients, credit, and supplies.”92  Note that Bain-
bridge sees the benefits of including persons on the board who can speak for
and offer insight from various non-equity investors, even though he notably
does not include employees in his list.  He describes the benefits of this kind
of board pluralism as including the ability to address information asymme-
tries and thus aiding in the creation of strategic alliances.93  This insight,
which seems right, would be true not only for business partners but for all
non-equity investors, including employees.  Employees, too, are in effect en-
tering into a strategic alliance with a firm when they invest their time, en-
ergy, and futures with the company.  They “need credible information about
the competencies and reliability of prospective partners,” just as the firm
needs credible information about their “competencies and reliability.”94
Making the board less homogeneous may make decisions less tidy,
since the board will have to take more views into account.  The board will be
forced to compromise so that decisions are acceptable to a majority or plu-
rality of stakeholders.  Decisionmaking will thus be more deliberative and
perhaps slower, but that is not in itself a reason to refuse to improve boards
by introducing a range of views and perspectives.  The real question is
whether additional diversity results in decisions that are worth the extra
effort.
The notion that decisions produced by a finely wrought process of dia-
logue and compromise are better than decisions made unilaterally by a uni-
92 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?  Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Govern-
ance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43 (2002).
93 Id.
94 Id.  Bainbridge also suggests that boards perform better when a larger board includes a
greater number of “specialists” who would aid in both the board’s monitoring and service
functions.  As he says, “complex business decisions require knowledge in such areas as ac-
counting, finance, management, and law.  Providing access to such knowledge can be seen as a
part of the board’s resource gathering function.” Id.   Boards cannot expect to be, and proba-
bly should not be particularly specialized, but they benefit from having specialists among
them. While Bainbridge’s examples are of investment bankers and attorneys, his reasoning
would extend to those having specialized insight about other non-equity investors.  As Bain-
bridge argues, “larger, more diverse boards likely contain more specialists, and therefore
should get the benefit of specialization.” Id. (emphasis added).  Bainbridge’s focus is more on
the size of boards, but he—perhaps inadvertently—makes the point about the diversity of
boards as well.
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form group of individuals is widely accepted by institutions other than
corporate boards.  Legislative bodies, administrative agencies, school facul-
ties, and nonprofit boards recognize that a diversity of viewpoints increases
the likelihood of groups welcoming dissent, hearing important perspectives,
and vetting decisions more fully.  In fact, greater diversity in perspectives
and backgrounds within the boardroom will lessen the risk over time that the
board will engage in the defects and systematic mistakes of “groupthink.”95
Notwithstanding the unique attributes of the corporation and the intense
competitive environment in which it operates, perhaps the same is true in
corporate governance.
The worries often expressed about stakeholder governance are over-
stated.  No constituency would have an incentive to hurt the company in
order to gain a larger piece of the pie.  Even if they did, they would be
violating their fiduciary duties to the firm as a whole and could be held to
account for their behavior.  Second, the possibility of strategic, “rent-seek-
ing” behavior already exists in the firm.  Currently only shareholders are
allowed to elect directors, and shareholders already have incentives to put
their interests ahead of the interests of the firm as a whole.  A pluralistic
board could actually stifle those selfish impulses, because any behavior that
benefits one stakeholder at the expense of the firm would be done in full
view of the others.
D. Answering Objections
There are two additional objections that the article has not yet ad-
dressed directly.
The “Two Masters” Argument
One worry about stakeholder governance is that a broadening of corpo-
rate responsibilities would actually make it easier for managers to avoid re-
sponsibility altogether.96  The argument goes something like this: if
corporate managers have more than one “master” (that is, not just share-
holders), they can avoid real responsibility to any stakeholder by claiming
their actions are to further the interests of another stakeholder.  Economists
would call this an “agency costs” argument: enlarging the duties of manage-
ment will increase the agency costs inherent in managing the firm, since it
will be more difficult to monitor whether the managers are in fact doing their
jobs carefully and in good faith.
First, this concern is inconsistent with another objection to stakeholder
governance that one often hears, namely that corporate law need not worry
95 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 143 (“defective decisionmaking” is “strongly R
correlated” with structural flaws such as “insulation and homogeneity”); Bainbridge, supra
note 92, at 32 (discussing groupthink). R
96 For a more developed argument on this point, see GREENFIELD, supra note 68; Green- R
field & Smith, supra note 71. R
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about stakeholder interests since looking after shareholders will inevitably
help other stakeholders as well.  Of course, shareholder advocates cannot
have it both ways. If the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are
not in conflict, then agency costs will not increase much if the law requires
managers to take into account the interests of other stakeholders.
A more accurate view is that there is indeed conflict between the inter-
ests of shareholders and other stakeholders in a range of cases, especially in
the short term.  Such conflict, however, is not a reason to fear that managers
are unable to handle increased responsibility or that it would be impossible
to know whether managers are doing their jobs well.  It is true, in a mundane
way, that someone who has two responsibilities may have more difficulty
meeting both than she would if she had only one.  But people routinely have
more than one responsibility, some of them even conflicting.  Humans are
quite accustomed to having a range of obligations.
Many business managers are asked to balance a multitude of obliga-
tions, some arising from corporate law, some from other areas of law, and
some from the market.  For example, corporations regularly issue different
classes of stock that afford different rights, but directors still owe fiduciary
duties to holders of all classes of stock even when the interests of the various
classes are in conflict.  It is not impossible for courts to analyze whether the
managers satisfied their fiduciary duties to be careful, act in good faith, and
not act in their own self-interest.
The only way in which having more and broader responsibilities would
make it easier for managers to avoid responsibility is that it would allow
them to use one obligation as a defense to a claim that they failed to satisfy
another.  This, however, is not a function of the number and scope of respon-
sibilities, but how they are enforced, and corporate law duties are simply not
enforced in a way that would allow managers to play one duty off the other.
Consider the duty of care.  When courts enforce that duty they reduce it
essentially to a procedural obligation, namely to investigate various alterna-
tives, to consider various possible outcomes, to take the time necessary to
deliberate effectively, and to erect certain monitoring systems to ensure the
smooth flow of information from throughout the company to the centralized
management.97  If managers were required to take account of, for example,
employees’ interests, the duty of care would be enforced in the same way it
is now.  No manager would be able to erect a defense to a shareholder claim
by saying she was unable to pay attention to the impact of the decision on
97 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 891 (Del. 1985) (finding that Director-defend-
ants breached the duty of care because of their failure to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision, and by their failure to disclose all
material information to the stockholders); In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litiga-
tion, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del.Ch. 1996) (finding that Director-defendants upheld the duty of
care by meeting and being informed by experts on the relevant issues and having monitoring
information systems in place); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 31 (N.J. 1981)
(finding that Director-defendant had breached the duty of care by nonfeasance because a direc-
tor has a duty to act, including acquiring at least a rudimentary understanding of the business
of the corporation).
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shareholders because she was thinking at the time about employees. The
managers would have to do both.  Yes, this may be more difficult.  But it is
not impossible, and it is certainly not the kind of difficulty that throws up
such dust that one cannot discern if the management is doing their jobs.
Similarly, the duty of loyalty would not be loosened if managers were
required to look after non-equity investors.  In corporate law, loyalty re-
quires managers not to engage in self-dealing.  Such an obligation would not
be undermined by including employees among the beneficiaries of manag-
ers’ fiduciary duties.  Rather, adding to the number of people who benefit
from managers’ fiduciary duties will make it less likely that managers will be
able to get away with self-dealing.  More corporate stakeholders will have an
interest in monitoring managerial conflict of interest.
Beneath the surface of the agency cost argument, one finds that the real
worry of the mainstream theorists is that adding to the responsibilities of
management will make it less likely that management will act like agents of
the shareholders.  Managers may indeed change their behavior in that way,
but asserting that such a change is a problem simply begs the question of
whether managers should serve only the interests of the shareholders.
Moreover, the existence of shareholder agency costs is not itself a per-
suasive argument, since other stakeholders also have agency costs.  Other
stakeholders make important contributions to the firm, and all stakeholders
depend on management to use those contributions to create wealth.  All
stakeholders depend on managers and therefore have an incentive to monitor
them.  A shareholder primacy rule makes it more difficult for these other
stakeholders to rely on management, which raises the stakeholders’ agency
costs.  A relaxation of the shareholder primacy model might increase the
agency costs of shareholders, but it will decrease the agency costs of non-
shareholder stakeholders, which are just as important as shareholders’
agency costs.
To say that only shareholders should have a rule that lowers their
agency costs assumes shareholder primacy.  But we cannot justify the rule of
shareholder primacy by pointing to shareholder agency costs, unless the
agency costs of other stakeholders are discounted.  Those costs can only be
discounted if shareholders are supreme.
Competitiveness
Another objection to a stakeholder model is that such a brand of corpo-
rate governance might kill the golden goose of American competitiveness.
Forcing corporate managers to take into account the interests of employees
and other stakeholders, the argument goes, will deaden companies’ ability to
make tough allocation decisions, to produce products at a low price, and to
succeed over time.
This worry is overblown.  As mentioned earlier, no stakeholder in the
firm benefits when a company fails, and no one is hurt more from the failure
of a publicly-traded company than its employees.  Shareholders, on the other
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hand, typically hold a diversified portfolio of stocks, and the failure of one
firm or another is not usually debilitating to a shareholder’s overall financial
situation.
In fact, a focus on shareholders will mean that companies will be more,
not less, likely to fail.  Because of their diversified portfolios and the fact
that they enjoy the protection of limited liability, shareholders actually tend
to prefer that companies whose stock they hold make risky decisions that
create an above-average return for their entire portfolio, but that risk bank-
ruptcy for individual firms.  Shareholders do not care much whether any
given firm fails, as long as their portfolio as a whole maximizes their ex-
pected returns.98
Employees, on the other hand, are not diversified in their labor invest-
ment—they typically work for one employer at a time and may have in-
vested much time and effort to develop firm-specific human capital. They
are not risk neutral, but as to their employment, risk averse. Rather than
being indifferent as to the risk of failure for the company for which they
work, employees care deeply about their firm’s financial health because they
stand to lose a great deal if their firm suffers.
What this means is that a company required to take into account em-
ployee interests will fail less often than a shareholder-dominated firm.  Be-
cause shareholders are relatively indifferent as to the possibility of any
single firm failing, managers who make decisions according to what is good
for the shareholders will bring about the failure of their companies more
often than managers who make decisions based on what is good for a
broader mix of stakeholders.
There is nothing incompatible with employee (and stakeholder) in-
volvement in management and business success.  As discussed above, as
employees feel more “ownership” in their firm, they will work harder, con-
tribute more ideas, improve their productivity, malinger less, and obey com-
pany rules more.  This will tend to improve company profitability over time.
The more difficult competitiveness critique to answer is not that indi-
vidual firms will fail if they take into account the interests of stakeholders,
but that capital (i.e., shareholders) will flee U.S. markets if a stakeholder
governance framework is established.  That is, if corporations are required to
take into account the interests of non-equity investors, then equity investors
will take their capital elsewhere.
It is true that recognizing a stakeholder framework might bring about a
reallocation of the corporate surplus away from shareholders and toward
other stakeholders.  That is part of the objective of such a framework.  But as
the stakeholder model creates gains for the corporation as a whole, then the
slice of the pie going to shareholders may grow in an absolute sense, even if
it is not as large in a comparative sense.
The judgment of capital is always a relative one—“will I make more if
I invest here or elsewhere?”—so a stakeholder corporate governance regime
98 For a more detailed analysis, see GREENFIELD, supra note 68, at 54–59. R
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will only cause capital to flee if it can find a better risk/return mix elsewhere.
Given the power and stability of U.S. markets, there are very few places
likely to offer a better risk/return ratio.  Europe’s current corporate govern-
ance framework is more protective of stakeholders than any regime the U.S.
is likely to enact, making it unlikely that capital will flee to Europe.  Indeed,
the fact that Europe has such a robust system of stakeholder protection while
maintaining healthy and competitive capital markets is an indication that
there is little reason to worry that capital will abandon ship if the U.S. adopts
a similar model.
Of course, an argument that capital will punish efforts to impose a
stakeholder governance regime is analogous to an objection to any regula-
tory effort that imposes costs on capital, whether it be a minimum wage,
additional environmental protection, or a ban on child labor.  In those set-
tings, a range of factors determines regulatory choices, including whether
the regulatory effort will be worth the various costs that might arise.  In
some cases, a public policy initiative (for example, limiting carbon emis-
sions from factories) would impose costs on capital, and those costs might
have an effect on whether capital will flow to U.S. securities markets or
markets overseas.  But an analysis of the costs must include a look at the
potential benefits as well (for example, a lessening of the rate of climate
change), and it would be unwise simply to succumb to the pressures from
those who threaten to take their capital and go home.
The same should be true with regard to stakeholder governance.  The
question is not simply whether there might be some short-term costs to capi-
tal, but whether benefits can be gained from the initiative that would balance
out those costs.  There is reason to be optimistic that they would, since these
benefits are of the kind that will build on themselves.
CONCLUSION
Corporations are creatures of law, and they are regulated pervasively by
various aspects of the legal system.  Law is essential to make the corporation
successful as an institution that collects various inputs and uses them to cre-
ate wealth.  At present, corporate law takes a very narrow view of the obli-
gations of corporate management, and this legal choice has resulted in a
number of social costs, including stagnant wages and increasing economic
inequality.
Corporate law reform thus represents an area of significant promise in
addressing issues of social concern.  If corporate management owed fiduci-
ary duties to the firm as whole, or if corporate decisionmaking bodies in-
cluded representatives of various stakeholders, the unique and powerful
capabilities of the corporation could be put to use to create wealth and to
distribute it broadly, and to do so more efficiently than through existing
regulatory options.
